Over the past month, speculation regarding Iran-United States relations has been hyperbolic at best, fictitious at worst. Now, the situation between the two countries has not been picture perfect since a direct policy was established post-World War Two, and there’s certainly something to be said for any policy drawn up in an era of mass suspicion. However, of late things have, according to the media, been getting progressively worse. The question is, how much has actually happened and what quantity is nothing more than sensationalist headlines and faux-psychic predictions?

To get a better idea of the current state of U.S.-Iranian affairs, an ideal place to start would be their beginning: examine the foundations upon which the relationship is built and see why it is in the state it is in today.

Past U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions

Though American interaction with Iran was nothing more than courteous and indifferent since it began in the 1800’s, following the Second World War, the United States became more heavily, on a covert level, involved. The root of the problems, not surprisingly, was oil — more specifically, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now British Petroleum).Then-Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, following his rapid consolidation of power and motion to nationalize the AIOC, had evoked fear in the Shah, Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, leading the United States to arrange a since-CIA-confirmed covert coup d’état through its embassy in Tehran in order to restore power to the Shah. In return for help in this endeavour, the Shah made many notable financial contributions to American institutions, and the United States had done what it does best, empowering pro-American leaders in countries that may otherwise pose a threat.

For the next few decades, Iran did not pose a threat to America, who therefore became the country’s foremost economic and military partner, a friendship which U.S. government officials expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Cue the 1979 Iranian Revolution: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, a pronounced anti-American revolutionary, takes the place of the thoroughly pro-American Shah, who was then grudgingly granted entry to the U.S. for cancer treatment — a move which only exacerbated tensions with the new, fundamentalist government.

Outrage followed, culminating in the Iran hostage crisis, in which 52 U.S. diplomats were held hostage for 444 days, sparked in part by fears of more United States interference in Iranian affairs, similar to the 1953 coup. Military force, as demonstrated by the failed rescue attempt “Operation Eagle Claw” in April of 1980, proved ineffective, and instead an end came in 1981 with the signing of the Algiers Accords, which expressly called for an end to political and military intervention by the U.S. in Iranian internal affairs.

In the midst of the crisis, all diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Iran were broken, setting the tone for the 1980’s, throughout which a series of heavily criticized policy decisions were made — including the Iran Air Flight 655 tragedy, in which 248 Iranian civilians were killed, in addition to other nationals, amongst them 66 children. The United States Government paid compensation to the victims’ families and covered legal expenses, but did not issue a specific apology to the Iranian government for the decision — only for the loss of innocent life.

Additionally, the First Persian Gulf War between Iran and Iraq — September 1980 — August 1988 saw United States provide material support to Iraq, a policy decision which in 2000 was apologized for by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, but nonetheless fostered anti-American sentiment in Iran. Needless to say, the developments of the 1980’s provided a hostile foundation for any future Iran-United States relations, and an embargo first imposed in 1995 by then-President Bill Clinton has since been renewed annually, citing trade sanctions against Iran for U.S. investors.

Since the turn of the century, animosity between the two states has worsened, arguably beginning on January 29th 2002 when then-President George W. Bush gave his highly controversial “Axis of Evil” speech, likening Iran to North Korea and Iraq; condemning them as a threat to U.S. security and a great evil. Since the address, which provoked outrage in Iran from not only fundamentalists but conservatives also, the U.S. military campaign in Iraq has provided ample opportunity to conduct unmanned surveillance flyovers to check the progress of the Iranian nuclear program and any other information deemed vital.

It is from this impasse that the events of this month stem. It is common knowledge that Iran has engaged in a nuclear program since the 1950s, an initiative run in conjunction with the United States in its formative years, until support was withdrawn by the West with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Since 2003, however, there has been U.S speculation about the intentions of the program, and fears that Iran is aiming to construct a nuclear bomb — an outcome which the U.S. dubbed unacceptable and said would use “all options” necessary to prevent. In a joint effort, the International Atomic Energy Association and the EU-3 established strict levels of monitoring and encouraged transparency in order to keep track of progress in the Iranian pursuit of sustainable nuclear energy, in return for support in the endeavour. The question is, where exactly has Iran violated the terms to warrant this month’s drama?

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Enforced in 1970 with the goal of facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, the treaty originated from the feared outbreak of a nuclear war, which, the signing nations maintained, would have dire consequences for mankind. The treaty, which can be found in full at its current 2005 ratification here, was signed by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China as the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states, and a total of 189 countries have signed to this day. It is the single most widely accepted arms control agreement in the world. By examining the major provisions of the treaty in parallel with current events, one can understand the real severity of the situation

Article I pertains to nuclear-weapon State Parties to the Treaty and thereby does not apply to Iran.

Article II

“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

To date, there is no evidence of Iran possessing a nuclear bomb, and only estimates by the IAEA as to the quantity of low-enriched uranium in Iran’s stockpile remotely suggest that an atomic weapon is possible. According to a report released February 19th, Tehran currently holds 1,010kg of low-enriched uranium, an amount which was declared by the government prior to inspection. Furthermore, the report reads that: “To date, the results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP5 indicate that the plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment).”

Though the report does not rule out the possibility of arms procurement, nor does it say that it is a likely endeavour, as Tehran has been forthright in its declarations of progress. The matter of the fact is, the IAEA does not know what the exact situation is, and as has been proven time and time again in the past, not knowing is often worse.

Article III

“1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices…”

The above provision, according to the same February IAEA report, has not been adhered to by Iran. Certain safeguards have been imposed by the committee, in the way of disclosure of plans and information, with which Tehran has not been complicit, and it is the feeling of the IAEA that “Unless Iran implements the above transparency measures and the Additional Protocol, as required by the Security Council, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Director General continues to urge Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date.”

Now, the severity of the offense and its potential ramifications are unclear, especially given the comments made by IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei in a televised interview in February of 2009: “many other countries are enriching uranium without the world making any fuss about it. Why are we making a fuss about Iran?” ElBaradei also maintained that Iranian insecurities are completely understandable, given the nature of its history with Western powers, and that the main concern for the agency was the withholding of information between 1992 and 2002.

Until 1992 a “six month clause” existed in the IAEA’s safeguards, which stated an inspection was not required of any plant until six months before nuclear material was set to arrive. An amendment to the policy was then made, mandating transparency and cooperation with the IAEA during even the planning stages of construction. At some time over the next 10 years, Iran worked on the construction and planning of several nuclear facilities, which was finally revealed on August 14, 2002, by dissident leader Alireza Jafarzadeh. Immediately following the revelation an IAEA investigation commenced and talks began between the EU-3 and Tehran, with an amicable decision being reached and the signing of additional protocol taking place on December 18, 2003. The United States, interestingly, played no part in the discussions: not willing to negotiate with Iran.

“Iran has to go out of its way to build confidence by opening up with the agency, provide maximum transparency…The international community should freeze its sanctions. And then, let us start and look for the grand bargain. ” &mdash IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei

Communication Breakdown

It would seem, then, that the attitude of ElBaradei is one of justified suspicion, but with due consideration of the level of paranoia contributing to the situation. The trade sanctions renewed by President Obama this month in response to suspicion of nuclear arms procurement are a step in the wrong direction, as was demonstrated by the Iranian reaction of calling them “childish,” and a big mistake, some fear; this still did not dissuade British Prime Minister Gordon Brown from again threatening Iran when animosity between the Middle Eastern nation and the rest of the world is rising.

The Obama administration has said that a tact of direct diplomacy is called for, and aims to repair some of the damage done by the alienation of Iran over the past 8 years. Still, it seems that the extension of the U.S. hand towards Iran will not be enough, and that slackening the heavy sanctions would do something to alleviate the suspicion that foreign intervention has earned through precedent.

Earlier this week, an unmanned surveillance drone was downed by coalition fighter jets inside the boundaries of the Iraqi desert. The craft, which the U.S. military said was suspected of spying in Iraq and was feared could be connected to perpetual suspicions of Iranian aid to rebel forces in its neighbouring country. Though the incident did not warrant the sensationalist media attention it garnered, it does speak testament to the catalytic nature of a breakdown of talks between nations, and should serve as a wake up call to diplomats as to the crucial nature of resumed talks.

The reasons for Iranian distrust of the United States go back over half a century, as the result has more often than not been change for the worse. The U.S., too, has reasons to doubt Iranian motivation, and has a habit of feeling insecure when any remote chance arises that it may lose some power, which presents us with an impasse, a stalling of progress, with regards to any possible solution. There has been a lot of talk, yet nothing said; a lot of predictions, yet no real proof; and a lot of nuclear energy, yet no nuclear bomb.

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